PrepTest 111, Section 2, Question 25
Ronald Dworkin argues that judges are in danger(458 more words not shown)
The passage suggests that Dworkin(13 more words not shown)
- AJudges and lawyers(15 more words not shown)
- BJudges should not(19 more words not shown)
- CLegal positivism is(15 more words not shown)
- DIf there is(20 more words not shown)
- ELegal positivists misunderstand(8 more words not shown)
Reading the passage
I don't have one specific statement to predict for this broad agreement question. Keep Dworkin's position in view: consensus isn't the whole story, moral intuition can play a role, and the law's internal principles constrain interpretation. Then check whether each complete claim follows.
Working the answers
- A
“Too often” adds a criticism Dworkin doesn't make. He wants to justify judges' treating legal questions as having answers without consensus, not complain that they do it too much.
- B
This gives the original legislators' intentions priority whenever they conflict with a judge's moral intuition. We aren't given that rule. The law's internal logic is the constraint, and interpretations may improve on what the original authors thought.
- C
The popularity comparison is stated, but its proposed explanation isn't. Nothing says positivism is more popular because it simplifies the judge's role. The true first part doesn't establish the added cause.
- D
Consensus doesn't tell judges to stop examining the law's logic. Dworkin's approach permits improvement on accepted interpretations; agreement alone doesn't make further reasoning inappropriate.
- ECorrect
Positivism separates law from morality and limits interpretation to identifying consensus. Dworkin says principles involving justice and fairness may require moral intuition. That limited, legitimate role for moral judgment is what the positivist account misses.
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