PrepTest 127, Section 1, Question 19
Editorialist: Some people argue that we have an(56 more words not shown)
The editorialist's argument depends on(6 more words not shown)
- AIf an entity(15 more words not shown)
- BAny entity that(5 more words not shown)
- COnly conscious entities(9 more words not shown)
- DAvoiding cutting down(12 more words not shown)
- EOne does not(13 more words not shown)
Reading the argument
An obligation not to cut down a tree might be owed to someone other than the tree. That is the distinction I want to keep track of as the editorialist develops the argument.
Suppose we owe future children a livable environment. Protecting trees could be part of that obligation even if the trees themselves had no rights. Or we might owe something to people living now who benefit from preserving the area. Those possibilities are enough to make us ask: to whom is the duty owed?
The editorialist's rule says an obligation to an entity requires a corresponding right held by that entity. Accept that rule, along with the statement that trees cannot have rights. Then we can conclude that we do not owe an obligation to the trees themselves.
But the final claim is broader: we have no obligation not to cut them down. The argument has moved from who can be owed an obligation to what we can be obligated to do. Our example shows why those are different. A duty owed to children could require an action involving trees.
What we’re looking for
For the required assumption, I expect something blocking that possibility: refraining from cutting trees is not an obligation owed to some other entity. Otherwise the conclusion could fail even if everything said about the trees' rights were true.
Working the answers
- A
This starts with an entity's right and infers our corresponding obligation. The stated rule starts with an obligation to an entity and requires that entity to have a right. More importantly, A does not rule out an obligation concerning trees that is owed to someone else. It leaves our objection intact.
- B
Having rights and having obligations are different roles. The argument discusses whether we owe anything to the trees, not whether trees themselves must fulfill duties. B says something about duties held by a rights holder that the conclusion does not require.
- C
The author states that trees cannot have rights without explaining that through a general rule about consciousness. Other entities might have rights for reasons unrelated to consciousness. The argument does not need C's broad restriction; it needs a reason that duties owed to others cannot require preserving trees.
- DCorrect
This rules out the possibility we identified. If avoiding cutting trees were owed to children or another entity, the absence of trees' own rights would not eliminate that obligation. The argument depends on excluding duties of that kind so that its point about obligations to trees can support its conclusion about not cutting trees.
- E
Ownership of the property is not part of the editorialist's reasoning. A limit on an owner's right to cut trees could arise for various reasons, but the argument neither establishes nor relies on that limitation. E does not close the gap between duties owed to trees and duties concerning trees.
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