PrepTest 122, Section 1, Question 23
Perception cannot be a relationship between a conscious(27 more words not shown)
Which one of the following(16 more words not shown)
- AArt cannot be(29 more words not shown)
- BLiberty cannot be(29 more words not shown)
- CPreparation cannot be(24 more words not shown)
- DHappiness cannot be(23 more words not shown)
- EPhysics cannot be(24 more words not shown)
Reading the argument
I can form a belief about my phone by perceiving it. Why would beliefs about something I cannot perceive show that this account of perception is wrong?
The proposed definition describes a relationship between a conscious being and a material object, where that relationship produces beliefs about the object. The author's objection gives us imperceptible objects that we nevertheless have beliefs about. But having the belief is only part of the proposed account. We haven't established that the belief came from the relationship the definition describes.
Think about the phone example. Seeing a phone could give me a belief about its color. I could also have a belief about an object I cannot perceive because someone told me about it. The second route wouldn't disprove the first. It would show that a belief can arise without perception.
What we’re looking for
For the parallel flaw, track the definition and the supposed counterexample. We're rejecting a definition because something outside the defined category shares one feature of the description. That is more specific than simply finding two different words or a conclusion saying something “cannot be” something else.
Working the answers
- ACorrect
Art corresponds to perception. The proposed definition describes an artifact deliberately created to cause an aesthetic reaction, just as the original describes a relationship that produces beliefs about an object.
The objection then points to things outside the category: artifacts that aren't art can still produce aesthetic reactions, just as imperceptible objects can still be objects of belief. But producing a reaction isn't the whole proposed definition of art. The definition also specifies the creator's purpose. A reaction to something not created for that purpose doesn't, by itself, defeat the definition. Both arguments use a shared feature as though it established a full counterexample.
- B
An obligation not to interfere is different from whether people actually interfere. People could violate an obligation. B attacks the proposed account of liberty by pointing to interference, rather than giving something outside liberty that shares one feature of the definition. Its objection turns on conduct versus obligation, not our incomplete counterexample.
- C
Preparation can be directed toward solving a problem without guaranteeing success. A problem too severe for preparation to solve doesn't show that the effort wasn't preparation. C attacks the effectiveness of the activity; it doesn't point to cases of nonpreparation that share a feature of the proposed definition. The word “no” doesn't supply that missing structure.
- D
This questions whether the comparison used in the definition can be made at all. It doesn't give an example of something that isn't happiness but shares part of the description. Compare that with A's concrete category mismatch: a reaction to an artifact that isn't art.
- E
This objects that finite human beings cannot understand what physics supposedly investigates. Investigating something and fully understanding it need not be the same. In any event, the objection concerns a limit on understanding; it doesn't give something outside physics that has one feature from the definition. It therefore doesn't reproduce our reasoning.
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