PrepTest 111, Section 4, Question 11
One approach to the question of which objects(42 more words not shown)
Which one of the following(10 more words not shown)
- AAny object that(20 more words not shown)
- BObjects posited for(9 more words not shown)
- CA scientific theory(15 more words not shown)
- DA scientific theory(10 more words not shown)
- EOnly objects posited(9 more words not shown)
Reading the argument
What makes us entitled to call something real? Seeing a coffee cup in front of us is one kind of basis. Including an unseen entity in a scientific theory is a different kind. This argument concerns a proposed rule for deciding which scientific entities to accept as real.
The rule says to select the theory with the greatest explanatory power and call all the entities it posits real, while excluding the others. At first that can sound like a debate over which theories are correct. But the author's target is the rule for designating entities as real, not a demand that we protect particular theories from criticism.
The objection is that most theories contain entities proposed solely for theoretical reasons. Why does that make the rule flawed? We need a reason that this kind of support is a problem for designating an entity as real. Simply pointing out that theories contain theoretical entities hasn't yet supplied that reason.
What we’re looking for
The question asks for a principle that helps justify the criticism. I'll look for a rule connecting the kind of support an entity has with whether we should designate it as real. Then we can test whether the proposed approach violates that rule.
Working the answers
- A
This favors designating an entity as real when it helps a theory explain things. That goes toward defending the kind of approach the author criticizes. It doesn't supply a reason that relying on entities posited solely on theoretical grounds is a defect.
- BCorrect
This supplies the missing restriction: something proposed only for theoretical reasons should not be designated as real. The approach selects entities because the chosen theory posits them, while the author points out that scientific theories commonly contain entities supported on theoretical grounds alone.
B explains why that feature creates a problem. An approach that designates such entities as real would violate the principle. This doesn't mean all scientific theories are worthless, or that the entities definitely do not exist. It says theoretical support alone is not an acceptable basis for giving them the designation 'real.'
- C
This concerns which entities a theory should include: only ones that help its explanatory power. We aren't told that the criticized theories include entities that fail to help explain anything. An entity could enhance explanatory power and still be proposed solely for theoretical reasons. C doesn't establish why that would make designating it as real a mistake.
- D
Sometimes using grounds other than theoretical ones doesn't rule out also using theoretical grounds alone in other cases. A theory could satisfy this recommendation while still containing the kind of entities the author worries about. D also doesn't tell us that those entities should be excluded from the designation 'real.'
- E
This requires an object to be posited by an explanatorily powerful theory before being designated real. That restriction doesn't keep out an entity supported only on theoretical grounds; a powerful theory might still posit it. E therefore doesn't explain why the feature the author identifies is a defect in the proposed approach.
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