PrepTest 159, Section 1, Question 13

Strategy of ArgumentDifficulty5 of 5
The questionFull text in your LawHub copy of PrepTest 159

A cognitive psychologist has claimed that intelligence is(72 more words not shown)

In the passage the author(6 more words not shown)

Reading the argument

Does understanding have to be aimed at solving a problem to count as intelligence? Someone might learn how a system works out of curiosity, without trying to overcome an obstacle.

That's why the proposed definition makes me pause. It doesn't merely require an ability to understand things; it ties that understanding to a particular purpose. We can imagine learning about numbers, language, or other people's feelings without a specific obstacle motivating the learning.

The author gives us a hypothetical being that understands how things work even though a desire to overcome an obstacle didn't prompt that understanding. We're told we would still recognize this being as intelligent. Accept that reaction for purposes of the argument. The proposed definition leaves out a case we would want it to cover.

What we’re looking for

For the method question, I'd describe the move this way: apply the definition to an imagined case and show that its result clashes with our judgment about that case. We don't need to invent a flaw in the author's reasoning to identify how it works.

Working the answers

  • A

    The complaint isn't that the definition is too vague or difficult to apply. We aren't stuck asking what its words mean or how to determine which cases qualify. The author applies it to a case and objects to the result: it would exclude a being we would regard as intelligent.

  • B
    Correct

    The imagined being supplies the hypothetical application. The counterintuitive result is that the definition would fail to count that being's understanding as intelligence because it wasn't acquired to overcome an obstacle. The author treats that mismatch with our accepted judgment as a reason to reject the definition.

  • C

    This says the definition isn't narrow enough. The author's objection runs the other way: requiring an obstacle-directed purpose makes it too restrictive. It leaves out something the author says we would recognize as intelligence.

  • D

    This would mean the definition includes things we normally wouldn't call intelligent. But the example concerns something we would call intelligent that the definition fails to include. The direction of the mismatch matters: excluding a wanted case is different from including an unwanted one.

  • E

    We hear that a cognitive psychologist proposed the definition, but the author doesn't argue that its supporters improperly defer to that person's authority. The objection concerns what happens when the definition is applied, not why anyone believes the psychologist.

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