PrepTest 155, Section 1, Question 13
Philosopher: As many prominent physicists have suggested, energy(48 more words not shown)
The philosopher's argument is most(10 more words not shown)
- AIt fails to(15 more words not shown)
- BIt overlooks the(19 more words not shown)
- CIt presumes, without(18 more words not shown)
- DIt fails to(19 more words not shown)
- EIt presumes, without(20 more words not shown)
Reading the argument
Even if every ingredient has a feature, does the finished object have to share it?
The language about energy being a 'theoretical construct' may make us pause. What exactly does that mean, and how well supported is it? But we can accept the philosopher's starting claims for this question and still challenge the final step.
The first move treats mass and energy alike because the argument says there is no essential distinction between them. If energy has the relevant feature, the philosopher says mass has it too. The later move is different: it goes from the features of an object's components to a claim about the object they form.
Combining things creates a whole, not merely another name for one of its parts.
Think of the states: California has a governor, and Montana has a governor. It would be a mistake to say that because the United States is made up of states with governors, the country as a whole must have a governor. The country has a president. The part's form of leadership doesn't automatically carry over to the whole.
What we’re looking for
The flaw question asks us to identify that same unsupported transfer here. Grant that mass and energy are theoretical constructs. We still need a reason to think an object composed of them must itself be a theoretical construct.
Working the answers
- A
Other things that might be made of mass and energy don't address this transfer. The conclusion concerns physical objects. Even if we identified another kind of thing with the same components, we'd still need to know whether being theoretical carries over from components to the whole.
- BCorrect
'Something' is the physical object. The 'things' composing it are mass and energy. Their shared 'feature' is being theoretical constructs. B identifies the possibility the argument overlooks: the physical object might lack that feature even if all its components have it. That is the distinction illustrated by the states and their governors.
- C
The philosopher's first move says mass and energy share the relevant feature because they are not essentially distinct. C criticizes assuming different features despite no essential distinction. That describes the opposite of what the argument does at that step.
- D
This concerns differences among members of the category of theoretical constructs. Our dispute comes earlier: has the philosopher established that a physical object belongs in that category at all? The argument's problem is transferring a feature from components to the whole, not assuming every theoretical construct shares every other feature.
- E
The reference to prominent physicists can make this tempting. But the argument doesn't announce that any suggestion by any physicist must be true. More importantly, even accepting the opening claim about energy leaves the later mistake intact: features of components don't automatically become features of the object. B directly identifies that unsupported move. E assigns the argument a broader rule about authority that it never states.
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