PrepTest 133, Section 3, Question 25
Political philosopher: A just system of taxation would(58 more words not shown)
The flawed reasoning in the(14 more words not shown)
- ACars should be(39 more words not shown)
- BPeople should be(35 more words not shown)
- CEveryone should pay(40 more words not shown)
- DIndividuals who confer(35 more words not shown)
- EJustice requires that(30 more words not shown)
Reading the argument
Wealth and income aren't the same thing.
Wealth is what someone has accumulated; income is what comes in during a period, such as a year. Someone could own a great deal while earning little this year. Someone else could earn a large salary while still having relatively little accumulated wealth. So a rule based on one measure doesn't automatically justify a rule based on the other.
The philosopher first says taxes should track how much society serves a person's interests. Then wealth is selected as the best measure of that benefit. If we follow those premises, wealth should determine the tax. But the conclusion substitutes income without explaining why that different measure will do the same job.
What we’re looking for
For the parallel-flaw question, look for all three pieces: a rule saying what should determine a treatment, a proposed measure of that factor, and a conclusion that quietly substitutes a related but different measure. Matching the topic of taxation won't be enough; we need the same switch.
Working the answers
- ACorrect
The treatment is taxation, and the relevant factor is danger. Speed is identified as the best measure of danger, just as wealth is identified as the best measure of society's benefit. Then the conclusion changes the measure to acceleration, just as the original changes wealth to income.
A car might reach its limit of 50 miles per hour very quickly, while another takes longer to accelerate but eventually reaches 200 miles per hour. Quick acceleration and high possible speed aren't interchangeable. Taxing one doesn't automatically implement the proposed rule based on the other. That recreates the original mistake with concrete, distinct quantities.
- B
This begins with a proportional rule: more maturity should mean more autonomy. It then mentions a test designed to measure maturity, and gives complete autonomy to anyone above a certain score. The test is still the measure in the conclusion; there isn't a switch to a different but related measure. Instead, B jumps from proportional treatment to a threshold for complete autonomy, without establishing why that cutoff warrants the maximum. That's a different mistake.
- C
This shares the taxation topic but doesn't identify one objective measure and then replace it with another. It moves from corporate subsidies to a conclusion that corporations should pay a greater share of income than individuals. We would need comparisons of benefits and the relevant income shares to support that result. The problem is an unsupported comparison between groups, not the wealth-to-income substitution.
- D
The first two statements connect beneficial individuals to high incomes and high-income individuals to high taxes. That chain can support a conclusion about taxing those individuals. The conclusion instead taxes beneficial activities. If we object, it is to moving from people to activities, not to choosing a reliable measure and quietly substituting a different measure. The intermediate high income remains the same throughout the chain.
- E
The rule distributes care according to need, and the conclusion gives the most seriously ill patients priority. This doesn't insert a separate measurement claim and then discard its measure for another one. It applies a need-based standard to a group treated as highly needy. Whatever questions we might ask about that application, it doesn't reproduce the original's specific switch between wealth and income.
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