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- PrepTest 133
- Section 1, Question 10
Ms. Sandstrom's newspaper column describing a strange natural(45 more words not shown)
The argument's conclusion can be(10 more words not shown)
- AOne should pay(27 more words not shown)
- BOne should pay(29 more words not shown)
- CIt is unlikely(22 more words not shown)
- DMs. Sandstrom knew(15 more words not shown)
- EThe Mendels believe(15 more words not shown)
Reading the argument
The visitors damaged the farm. Why should the columnist have to pay?
Her column brought attention to the strange phenomenon, and that attention led people to trespass. But Sandstrom could respond, 'I didn't trespass. Those people chose to go onto the property.' Causing interest in a place and owing money for someone else's damage are not automatically the same thing.
The argument supplies a proposed dividing line: Sandstrom should pay if she could reasonably have expected her column to lead to the damage. We need a rule that makes that expectation enough to create the duty to pay.
What we’re looking for
That's what the question asks us to add. We don't need to research the actual law or decide who we personally blame. We need a principle that connects the facts to this conclusion: when your action leads others to cause damage, and you could reasonably have expected that result, you should pay for it.
Working the answers
- ACorrect
This supplies the rule we need. Sandstrom's action is publishing the column; the other people's conduct is trespassing and damaging the farm. The passage says her action led to that damage. Under A, if she could reasonably have expected that outcome, she should pay. That establishes exactly the conditional conclusion the argument makes.
- B
This sets a requirement for owing payment; it doesn't tell us that meeting the requirement makes someone owe payment. Saying 'You should pay only if you expected damage' rules out payment when that expectation is absent. It does not establish that everyone with the expectation should pay.
B also speaks of actually expecting the damage. The conclusion uses the different standard of what Sandstrom could reasonably have expected. A matches that standard and makes it sufficient; B doesn't.
- C
Perhaps the trespassers won't pay. Why does that transfer the obligation to Sandstrom? We still need a rule making her responsible. Someone else's unwillingness or inability to compensate the Mendels doesn't by itself establish that the columnist should do so.
- D
Knowing that trespassing could happen doesn't tell us who ought to pay for the resulting damage. This provides information about Sandstrom's awareness, but the missing connection is from foreseeable consequences to a duty to pay. Even with D, that rule is missing.
- E
The Mendels' belief that Sandstrom can form reasonable expectations is not a principle assigning responsibility for damage. They could be right about her ability and we could still ask why she should pay for the visitors' actions. A answers that question; E doesn't.
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