PrepTest 130, Section 3, Question 8

DisagreementDifficulty3 of 5
The questionFull text in your LawHub copy of PrepTest 130

Otis: Aristotle's principle of justice says that we(70 more words not shown)

It can be inferred on(12 more words not shown)

Reading the argument

Are a family friend and a stranger relevantly similar for this purpose? Otis treats them as though they are. He moves from the rule that similar cases deserve similar treatment to the claim that a dentist must not offer a friend an appointment the dentist would refuse everyone else.

We could also question whether to accept Aristotle's principle in the first place. But Tyra explicitly accepts it, so that isn't where these two speakers part company. She thinks friendship makes special favors permissible.

Tyra's appeal to human nature isn't automatically a defense of what people ought to do. Wanting to do something doesn't, by itself, establish that it's just. Still, we can understand her position without deciding whether her defense is convincing: she accepts the rule about relevantly similar cases while denying that it forbids special treatment for friends.

What we’re looking for

The question asks for their disagreement, not for the better argument. My initial description is that they disagree about whether the dentist may favor friends. We should look for an answer that captures how that dispute fits their shared principle.

Working the answers

  • A

    Tyra expressly accepts Aristotle's principle. Her objection concerns its application to friends and other patients, not whether it is widely applicable. Neither speaker gives us a general assessment of how many situations the principle covers.

  • B
    Correct

    Otis's application treats the friend and other patients as relevantly similar: the same appointment policy should apply to both. Tyra accepts the principle but permits the special favor, treating friendship as a relevant difference. She doesn't state that distinction in these exact words, but it is the distinction implied by accepting the rule while rejecting Otis's application of it.

  • C

    Tyra says people naturally want to favor friends, not that treating similar cases similarly is impossible. In fact, she can regard the cases as different and regard special favors as consistent with the principle. A dispute about what is just doesn't establish a dispute about what humans can possibly do.

  • D

    Otis needn't want the dentist to offer after-hours appointments to everybody. Refusing them to everyone, including friends, would also avoid the unequal treatment he objects to. So we cannot assign Otis the unrestricted appointment policy this answer describes.

  • E

    Neither speaker reports Aristotle's views about friendship outweighing justice. Tyra says favoring friends is not unjust, which differs from saying it is unjust but morally justified by something more important. This answer attributes a position to Aristotle that the exchange never supplies.

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