PrepTest 129, Section 3, Question 22
To win democratic elections that are not fully(54 more words not shown)
The argument is vulnerable to(10 more words not shown)
- Athe primary function(26 more words not shown)
- Bin democracies in(25 more words not shown)
- Cin democracies, government-subsidized(28 more words not shown)
- Din democracies in(33 more words not shown)
- Ea democracy in(18 more words not shown)
Reading the argument
Let's accept the starting condition: in elections that are not fully government-funded, nonwealthy candidates need wealthy supporters to win. That includes elections receiving some public funding if it does not cover them fully.
It is plausible that a candidate would change a position to attract those supporters. It isn't inevitable; a wealthy donor might already agree with the candidate. But the author goes further and declares the concern false because wealthy people are spread across the political parties in roughly the same proportion as in the population.
Why does that remove the pressure? Wealthy members of different parties could disagree on some questions while agreeing on an issue that affects their finances. Imagine wealthy donors across several parties sharing a preferred business-tax policy. A candidate who disagrees with that policy might have trouble finding support without changing position, even though wealthy people belong to every party.
What we’re looking for
For the flaw question, I'd look for a possibility like that: the distribution across parties may conceal limits on the range of views wealthy patrons support. Counting which parties patrons belong to does not establish that every candidate can obtain support without compromise.
Working the answers
- A
We don't need to know the primary purpose of political parties to assess whether candidates face pressure from donors. A party could have some entirely different purpose, and its candidates might or might not compromise their views. The flaw concerns what the distribution of wealth establishes about that pressure.
- BCorrect
The range of positions endorsed by parties may be much narrower than the range individual candidates hold. That gives another way the party-level distribution can fail to answer the concern.
Imagine several parties supporting different versions of a moderate policy, while some candidates favor a much more radical alternative. Wealthy supporters spread across those parties would not necessarily supply support for the alternative. A candidate outside the parties' range could still face pressure to move toward the positions those patrons support.
B does not prove that wealthy people are all moderates or that candidates actually change their views. It identifies what the author's evidence leaves unresolved: representation across parties is not necessarily representation across all candidate positions. That is enough to undermine the dismissal of the concern.
- C
This concerns what government funding can do to limit wealthy people's influence. It does not show that distributing wealthy supporters across parties removes that influence. Public funding could reduce dependence on patrons while candidates in elections not fully covered by the government still face pressure. The author can accept the possible benefit of subsidies without answering B's objection.
- D
Equal chances of winning for wealthy and nonwealthy candidates do not establish equal freedom from donor pressure. A nonwealthy candidate might have the same chance of winning precisely after obtaining wealthy support and compromising to get it. D does not settle the issue the author dismisses.
- E
Other flaws in a democracy do not show that this particular concern is present. The author argues that candidates do not compromise for wealthy support, not that democracies are perfect. E leaves the contested inference untouched.
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