PrepTest 113, Section 3, Question 18

FlawDifficulty3 of 5
The questionFull text in your LawHub copy of PrepTest 113

Not all works of art represent something, but(64 more words not shown)

The reasoning above is questionable(8 more words not shown)

Reading the argument

A painting of a lake can affect me partly because I recognize the lake. An abstract arrangement of colors might affect me differently. I can follow the claim that representing something matters to our experience of some art.

But does that one property decide whether something is art at all?

The author says representation depends on context and that we lack clear criteria for identifying context-dependent properties. Let's grant that difficulty. The conclusion then rules out any clear criteria for classifying an object as art. That is a much broader claim than uncertainty about whether an object represents something.

What about other properties? Perhaps a proposed definition could focus on creative expression, the use of color, or some other feature. We haven't established that any particular definition works. The point is that trouble using representation doesn't eliminate every other way of drawing the distinction.

What we’re looking for

For the flaw question, I'd look for that overlooked possibility: art might be identifiable through properties other than representation.

Working the answers

  • A

    Judging our aesthetic experience of a known work of art isn't the same as deciding whether an object qualifies as art. A says we cannot judge the experience of nonrepresentational works. That wouldn't supply an alternative way of classifying objects, which is the possibility the conclusion wrongly dismisses.

  • B

    An object having an aesthetic property without being art would show that the property alone doesn't guarantee art. The author hasn't claimed that every object with any aesthetic property must be art. The relevant question is whether other properties could provide clear criteria for classification. B doesn't identify that possibility as C does.

  • C
    Correct

    Other aesthetically relevant properties could determine whether an object is art. Then the difficulty identifying representation wouldn't prevent a clear classification. The author treats a problem with one property as though it rules out all usable criteria.

    We don't need to settle the definition of art ourselves. C identifies an alternative that the reasoning hasn't excluded, which is enough to expose the gap in the broad conclusion.

  • D

    A work of art could have irrelevant properties—its weight, for example—without telling us whether a clear criterion for art exists. D starts with something already classified as art and notes a feature that doesn't affect our aesthetic experience. That doesn't address how the classification might be made.

  • E

    Something could represent another thing without being a work of art. That would show representation alone doesn't guarantee the classification. But the argument's mistake is ruling out all clear criteria because representation is difficult to identify. E doesn't point to another usable criterion or resolve that leap. C directly supplies the neglected possibility.

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