LR Drill Set 3, Question 3
Political philosopher: Some people advocate the general-happiness principle,(66 more words not shown)
Which one of the following(9 more words not shown)
- AThe welfare of(11 more words not shown)
- BPrinciples impractical in(7 more words not shown)
- CGovernmental policies should(12 more words not shown)
- DPolitical principles are(16 more words not shown)
- EAny government policy(17 more words not shown)
Reading the argument
Would we really know whether a policy made everyone happier overall?
The proposed principle says a policy is justified exactly when it increases the overall happiness of those affected. My first concern is what that measure might overlook. A policy could benefit many people while seriously harming a smaller group. We might want to consider their rights as well as the combined happiness total.
But the philosopher makes a different objection: we cannot accurately estimate the total. A policy has infinitely many consequences, and only a few are predictable. How would we add up the happiness effects of consequences we can't anticipate?
I can see that practical difficulty. I still want to ask whether a rough judgment could be useful even if a complete calculation is impossible. Could a government reasonably think one policy is likely to be better without knowing an exact total? The philosopher needs a reason that this difficulty means we should use a different principle.
What we’re looking for
We're asked for a supporting rule. I'd look for one saying that a principle we cannot practically apply should not be used. That would connect the problem of estimating happiness with the recommendation to justify policies another way.
Working the answers
- A
Distinguishing welfare from happiness could support a different objection to the happiness principle. But this argument's reason for rejecting it is that its consequences cannot be accurately estimated. A doesn't connect that practical problem to the recommendation. It moves toward the kind of value objection I first considered rather than strengthening the reasoning the philosopher actually offers.
- BCorrect
A principle that is impractical to apply should not be employed. The philosopher's evidence is that we can't accurately estimate the total effect the happiness principle requires us to assess. B makes that inability a reason to use something else. It supplies the practical standard missing between “we can't make this estimate” and “we should appeal to another principle.”
- C
We are never told how individual actions should be justified. A rule requiring a different approach for governments therefore doesn't establish which approach to use or reject here. We would need an additional premise putting the happiness principle on the individual side of that comparison.
- D
This gives a way a principle could be acceptable: some policies it supports agree with common sense. We don't know whether the happiness principle meets that test, and the argument isn't built on a conflict with common sense. D doesn't turn the inability to estimate every consequence into a reason to avoid the principle.
- E
A policy could be less than maximally efficient and still be reasonably justified. The argument needs a rule about what counts as an acceptable justification, not merely a prediction about efficiency. E also shifts from evaluating the principle to evaluating a policy based on unreliable predictions. B addresses the principle's practical usability directly.
More Strengthen questions
Learn the LSAT our way
Our platform drills Strengthen questions at your level and adjusts as you improve.